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Abstract 
This paper uses a novel dataset collected by the first author from peri-urban areas of Ho 
Chi Minh City, Vietnam in 2008 to examine how the poor use their loans, and factors affecting 
their credit participation and credit constraints. The paper finds the presence of many 
commercial banks in the areas does not help the poor, but the poor rely heavily on informal 
credit. Loans in the peri-urban areas are mainly used for non-productive purposes, which stresses 
the importance of consumption smoothing motives. Further, households in more rural wards 
have a higher probability of borrowing than more urban households, thanks to better community 
relationships and higher interpersonal trust. Competition by borrowing neighbours adversely 
affects the opportunity for borrowing in urban wards where the poor households‟ borrowings 
rely much more on subsidized credit funds. A closer look at specified microcredit sources reveals 
that household behaviours differ in each market segment. Furthermore, the poor are highly 
credit-constrained. Wealthier households, in terms of asset holdings and phone possession, 
among the poor group appear less credit-constrained. However, except in the most rural part of 
the study area, the likelihood of credit constraints increases with distance to the nearest banks, 
which suggests that supply-side intervention could help in overcoming credit constraints. 
Overall, the poor in urban wards are more credit-constrained because of exclusion by 
commercial banks and weak interpersonal trust. 
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1. Introduction 
Microfinance, including microcredit as the main part, and other micro financial services such as 
insurance and savings vehicles, has become a popular tool in poverty alleviation efforts in 
developing countries (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010; Microcredit Summit, 2004). The poor have 
inadequate access to formal credit resources because of barriers imposed by lenders and 
relatively high transaction costs for small-size loans that discourage lending to the poor (e.g. 
Khandker, 2005; Pitt & Khandker, 1998; Microcredit Summit, 2007). Thus, a sizeable proportion 
of poor households are almost certain to borrow from the informal credit sector (Banerjee & 
Duflo, 2007, 2010). In Vietnam, the poor typically fail to meet the formal credit requirements, 
and hence find it difficult to access formal credit. Recent studies show that in 2002 the informal 
credit sector provided approximately 50% of the total credit to the poor and low income 
households (IFC, 2006; VDR,
2
 2004).  
The success of microcredit in alleviating poverty first depends on credit participation and 
credit constraints. The existing empirical evidence on determinants of credit participation and 
credit constraints is well established for rural areas (Barslund & Tarp, 2007; Diagne, 1999; 
Diagne, Zeller, & Sharma, 2000; Izumida & Pham, 2002; Nguyen, 2007; Thaicharoen, 
Ariyapruchya, & Chucherd, 2004), and for western countries (Avai & Toth, 2001; Chen & 
Chivakul, 2008; Crook, 2001; Crook & Hochguertel, 2005; Crook & Hochguertel, 2007; Del-Rio 
& Young, 2005; Margi, 2002). In contrast, investigation into determinants of credit participation 
and credit constraints for peri-urban households, in Vietnam and elsewhere, is rare.  
Lack of analysis for peri-urban areas probably results from a belief that in these areas 
financial services are available to everyone. This may not be true, as the poor in developing 
countries who migrate to cities often dwell in peri-urban areas and usually rely on credit to 
smooth their consumption expenditure.
3
 Unlike the rural poor who can increase labour earnings 
via off-farm work, reduce purchased other inputs and use more self-produced products when 
they face shocks, the urban or peri-urban poor cannot have the same coping strategies (Kochar, 
1995). Most of the urban and peri-urban poor are unskilled and involved in the informal sector; 
most of them tend to work casually as wage or daily workers (Rashid, 2000, p. 247). During 
adverse (e.g. disaster, economic) shocks, work opportunities and wages reduce, so households 
are unable to offset the income decline by sending more members to labour markets or by 
increasing the number of working hours (Fallon & Lucas, 2002; McKenzie, 2004; Rashid, 2000). 
Therefore, to fill the income shortage, credit would become important in these areas, especially 
                                                 
2
 Vietnam Development Report  
3
 For example, data from HCMC Statistical Office show that population growth rates are 2.7% and 82% for urban 
districts and peri-urban districts over the last 12 years (1997-2009), respectively. These data are available at 
http://www.pso.hochiminhcity.gov.vn/so_lieu_ktxh/2000/Dan_so_va_lao_dong/0203.htm/view, and 
http://www.pso.hochiminhcity.gov.vn/so_lieu_ktxh/2009/Dan_so_va_lao_dong/0201.htm/view 
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for the poor who have low savings (Skoufias, 2003). Nevertheless, the determinants of credit 
participation and credit constraints for the poor in these areas remain unknown. 
This gap in the current literature prompts the current study to search for answers to the 
following questions: First, does the presence of financial institutions fully offer the peri-urban 
poor access to credit resources? Second, what are determinants of credit constraints and credit 
participation by the poor? Third, is the credit market segmented, even just amongst the poor, in 
the peri-urban areas? 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section provides theoretical the background. 
Section 3 discusses the data collection and analysis framework. Empirical results are presented 
in Section 4. The final section offers a summary. 
2. Theoretical background 
Although the concept of credit access and participation has been used interchangeably, access to 
credit differs from credit participation. Access to credit means a household is both able to 
borrow, thanks to credit availability, and can satisfy lending criteria established by lenders; 
regardless of whether they borrow or not. On the other hand, credit participation means that a 
household has chosen to borrow and has already borrowed. A household that has participated in 
borrowing activities has, of course, access to particular credit resources, whereas a household 
having access to credit may choose whether or not to participate in borrowing activities.  
According to Diagne (1999, p. 7), credit participation is more related to potential 
borrowers‟ choice (demand for credit), whereas credit access is more from the supply-side and 
related to potential lenders‟ choice. Therefore, the concept of credit access closely links to credit 
constraints. Full credit access implies no constraints imposed by lenders. Likewise, limited credit 
access means some forms of credit constraints being imposed.  
There are two approaches to investigate household credit participation and credit 
constraints: the demand for consumption smoothing and the analysis of determining factors. The 
first approach has been widely used to examine how smooth household consumption is during 
adverse income shocks, and the ways by which households can cope with risks. The second 
approach is to determine factors affecting household credit participation and constraints. We 
shall discuss these approaches in turn. 
2.1 Consumption smoothing approach 
In the consumption smoothing approach, there are two ways to explain the existence of credit 
transactions: the permanent income hypothesis and community risk pooling/sharing.  
First, the permanent income hypothesis: according to Friedman (1957), any change in 
consumption caused by shocks to income (transitory income) could be smoothed sufficiently by 
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borrowing under perfect capital markets,
4
 because households will try to maximize their utility 
over the life cycle by borrowing when having transitory low income and by saving when having 
transitory high income. Thus, demand for household credit is derived from the demand for 
smoothing consumption against the income shocks. The violation of assumptions of perfect 
capital markets in developing countries where the financial markets are heavily distorted by 
asymmetric information problems, however, could be a reason to justify the existence of credit 
constraints and credit rationing (Conning & Udry, 2007; Morduch, 1995). Therefore, under 
imperfect financial markets, consumption is not completely smoothed (Dercon & Krishnan, & 
Studiën, 2000; Duflo & Udry, 2004; Goldstein, 2004). Dependence of consumption on not only 
permanent income but also transitory income implies that households are not able to borrow 
sufficiently to fill the income gap caused by adverse shocks; thus, under this condition the 
households are credit-constrained (Morduch, 1995, p. 107).  
However, the violation of the permanent income hypothesis could result from not only 
credit constraints but also household precautionary behaviour (Deaton, 1991; Morduch, 1990; 
Paxson, 1992). Household savings, other accumulated assets, external assistance and remittances 
or cash transfers could be effective absorbers of the income shocks which help to keep household 
consumption smoothed even if the household is credit-constrained (Deaton, 1991; Kurosaki, 
2006). In such cases, demand for credit would not be derived directly from demand for 
consumption smoothing, and the credit constraints could not necessarily be inferred from tests 
for consumption smoothing.  
Moreover, many households, especially the poor, may not have enough savings. Such 
households may want to spend money today rather than waiting until tomorrow; and this 
approach to spending makes credit constraints more persistent (Armendariz & Morduch, 2005, p. 
193). And of course, no savings means no accumulated assets. Armendariz and Morduch argue 
that credit constraints may be explained by the existence of saving constraints.  
In addition, in many developing countries, a significant proportion of the population is not 
insured or is inadequately insured. Many governments are not able to afford safety nets for their 
citizens to help them mitigate adverse shocks. Therefore, adverse health shocks to non-working 
members of households, which do not directly affect household income, will still generate credit 
demand if the households have inadequate savings to pay healthcare bills (Kochar, 1995). 
Consequently, credit constraints may occur if the households are not able to borrow sufficiently. 
                                                 
4
 The theory says that both household income and consumption consists of permanent and transitory components; 
while permanent components of income and consumption are positively related, there is no correlation between 
transitory components or between either transitory component and the permanent component of the other variable. 
Therefore, a temporary change in income (i.e. transitory income) would have no effect on consumption. 
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In addition, in developing countries the demand for credit is not only for coping with 
income shortage, but also for financing household economic activities; under imperfect financial 
markets, the credit constraints may exist if the households are not able to borrow adequately to 
meet the demand for production capital. The credit demand would be greater if households either 
have larger production projects or face adverse shocks to their production activities such as 
animal death, harvest loss, drought, flooding, and other disasters; hence households need more 
capital to enlarge or restore their production. 
The community relationship and risk pooling/sharing: is another channel of adverse shock 
absorption and risk sharing. To see how changes in current income affect household 
consumption, and how completely a community shares the risks, we consider the following 
equation (Townsend, 1995, p. 90). 
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where y
i
 and c
i
 are income and consumption of household i respectively, g is the group (village 
or community), and  is the error term. The dependent variable is the consumption change for a 
particular household. The main explanatory variables of equation (1) are: the first component is 
mean consumption change for the community or risk-pooling group, and the second component 
is the idiosyncratic income change for a particular household, and the last is any other shocks. If 
the risk sharing (pooling) is complete, the coefficient of group consumption will be one (β=1), 
and the coefficient of idiosyncratic household income will be zero (=0). 
Empirically, β is often smaller than one and  is greater than zero; it implies the risk 
sharing is substantial, but less than perfect (Townsend, 1995, Table 2). This fact rejects the 
hypothesis of full risk-sharing because  is greater than zero. The higher  is the less complete is 
insurance by risk-pooling community/group; changes in household consumption are more 
associated with changes in current household income. For instance, Townsend (1995, p. 93-94) 
shows that the coefficient of risk-sharing is lower for the greater Bangkok region than for other 
poorer regions in Thailand because the consumption changes of the households in Bangkok are 
highly correlated with their own idiosyncratic income shocks, but less correlated with pooling of 
risk among their community. On the other hand, households in rural (poorer) areas have better 
risk-sharing than their counterparts in urban areas since the changes in village‟s average 
consumption affects household‟s consumption through borrowing transactions and other mutual 
help (Townsend, 1994).  
Furthermore, Townsend (1994) finds that household consumption co-moves with village 
average consumption, but is not much influenced by current household income, sickness, 
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unemployment, and other household idiosyncratic shocks. He also finds that responses to 
changes in income in order to smooth consumption could be borrowing activities from the 
community or banks. Moreover, responses to household income fluctuations are credit 
transactions rather than sales of assets (Lim & Townsend, 1994; Townsend, 1994).  
Kochar (1995, 1999) argues that income shocks do not necessarily require credit 
participation because households are able to prevent the decline of household income by 
increasing labour earnings and reducing other inputs. On the other hand, income fluctuations 
caused by demographic shocks (e.g. death, sickness) can only be smoothed by using credit and 
depleting non-financial assets since households have lost potential earning labour. Kurosaki 
(2006, p. 75) provides evidence that villagers in Pakistan used credit, especially informal credit, 
as the most important mechanism to cope with adverse income shocks. 
Furthermore, the demand for insurance and credit is high in most low-income economies 
(Morduch, 1995, p. 105) because income is not only low but also unstable. Households become 
vulnerable when consumption declines after adverse income shocks. In well-functioning 
markets, households may not be vulnerable to income shocks because all risks should be 
diversified away, hence idiosyncratic or transitory shocks should have no impact on 
consumption. Households can borrow or save to fill up or send off the changes in their income, 
therefore, consumption smoothing is complete. When credit markets are imperfect, households 
are constrained in their ability to obtain credit, and the effect of transitory income on 
consumption would help explain unsmoothed consumption.  
In short, the response to consumption fluctuations is complex. It can be community risk 
sharing, production diversification, labour earnings, external assistance, sales of accumulated 
assets, and borrowing. Labour income may be one of the solutions, but it is ineffective in 
conditions of inadequate employment (both wage and self-employment) during economic 
downturn/crises (McKenzie, 2004); credit access is the other absorber of the shocks. However, 
capital market imperfection may result in imperfect risk sharing and credit constraints. 
 2.2 Analysis of determining factors approach  
This approach to investigating credit participation and credit constraints uses household 
information, such as physical and human capital endowments, in a reduced-form regression 
equation, to identify the determinants of credit participation and constraints (Barslund & Tarp, 
2007; Chen & Chivakul, 2008; Crook & Hochguertel, 2005, 2007; Diagne, Zeller & Sharma, 
2000; Jappelli, 1990; Zeller, 1994). Most of the studies define credit-constrained households as 
the rejected applicants and discouraged households. Kedir, Ibrahim, and Torres (2007) add 
another group of households; those who are lent an amount less than the amount they demanded 
(borrower‟s optimum amount). However, few of the studies define precisely the credit-
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unconstrained households. They implicitly treat all households who did not borrow as credit-
constrained; but in fact, some households did not borrow because they had enough resources. 
These households should be considered credit-unconstrained.  
Credit participation should be determined by borrowers‟ demand for credit and their 
creditworthiness, which is used as criteria to sort out clients by the lenders. Therefore, factors 
determining credit participation should represent either borrowers‟ demand for credit or 
borrowers‟ creditworthiness. If borrowers are from the general population rather than just from 
poor households, better endowments (physical and human resources) may enable the households 
to participate in borrowing activities (Johnston & Morduch, 2007). For example, income, farm 
size, land and house value, other durable and fixed assets, education, household size or labour 
force, occupation and ages are important determinants of credit participation (Crook, 2001; Del-
Rio & Young, 2005; Diagne, 1999; Izumida & Pham, 2002; Margi, 2002; Nguyen, 2007).  
On the other hand, if focusing on poor households, the above determinants may play other 
roles in explaining credit participation. They could be driving demand factors rather than 
components of creditworthiness. For example, physical endowments (e.g. assets/land) and 
human endowments (e.g. education) have a negative relationship with credit participation 
(Khandker, 2001; Khandker, 2005; Thaicharoen, Ariyapruchya, & Chucherd, 2004).  
The different determinants of credit participation for different groups of borrowers imply 
that the credit markets in developing countries are segmented. The lenders may apply different 
strategies to screen applications and evaluate clients‟ creditworthiness for different credit 
segments (Conning & Udry, 2005, p. 7). 
Credit constraint is the typical feature of the credit market in developing countries 
(Conning & Udry, 2005). Potential borrowers are often excluded, discouraged, rejected, or 
rationed to smaller loans relative to what they might have optimally demanded. Potential 
borrowers are systematically sorted out due to their low endowments.  
Determinants of credit constraints would better represent barriers to credit markets than 
those of credit participation because credit constraints reflect obstacles on the credit supply side 
that block borrowers from accessing credit sources. Thus, the factors affecting credit constraints 
are components of creditworthiness or lending criteria, and are often used by the lenders to 
evaluate their clients‟ creditworthiness in order to sort out potential borrowers. Factors such as 
age, income, assets, education, occupation, and borrowing experience are empirically found to be 
significant determinants of credit constraints (Avai & Toth, 2001; Chen & Chivakul, 2008; 
Crook & Hochguertel, 2005, 2007; Kedir et al, 2007; Jappelli, 1990; Zeller, 1994).  
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In addition, in many poor countries, especially in rural areas where real estate markets are 
rigid due to asymmetric information problems and difficulties in enforcing contracts (Morduch, 
1995), the fixed assets are often under-valued. As a result, fixed assets such as land and 
dwellings may not be important determinants of credit constraints and credit rationing. For 
example, Zeller (1994) shows that physical collateral plays an insignificant role in credit 
rationing in both informal and formal credit markets. Even in urbanised areas, where the real 
estate markets function better, lack of legal documents for household property would also cause 
lenders to not accept the pledge of the fixed assets as collateral or else they substantially 
undervalue the assets when they are lodged as collateral.   
Another obstacle to borrowing involves invisible barriers such as complicated or 
ambiguous procedures. These discourage potential borrowers, especially the poor, who are likely 
to have little education and limited social networks. Further, many households “fear” 
commercial banks and civil servants when they deal with them to have documentation completed 
for borrowing from formal credit suppliers. Consequently, poorer households may treat the 
banks and civil servants as alien entities, so the close geographical proximity fails to help the 
urban poor access formal credit. For example, Barslund and Tarp (2007) find that in Vietnam 
distance to nearest banks has no effect on credit rationing. It is likely that nearby households are 
not impeded by the distance to the banks, but are probably blocked by the invisible obstacle of 
complicated procedures. Therefore, improving education and simplifying lending procedures 
may be necessary to mitigate credit constraints.  
3. Data and Analytical Framework  
3.1 Data  
A sample of 411 borrowing and non-borrowing households was interviewed in early 2008 in the 
peri-urban District 9, Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC), Vietnam.
5
 Since our focus is on microcredit 
impacts on poor households, the sample was selected from a list of poor households whose initial 
income per capita was below the HCMC general poverty line of VND 6 million (approximately 
US$1 per day).
6
 The target sample size was set at 500 households, including 100 reserves, to 
achieve a realised sample of 400. In fact, 411 households were successfully interviewed, 
accounting for 26% of the total number of poor households in each of the selected wards in the 
district. The interviewed sample provides 304 borrowing households and 107 non-borrowing 
households, with 2,062 members, 955 (46.3%) males and 1,102 (53.7%) females. The sample is 
likely to be representative for the poor group whose initial income per capita is below the 
poverty line at the survey time in the district but will not be representative for Ho Chi Minh City 
nor for Vietnam. 
                                                 
5
 HCMC has 24 Districts. District 9 has the 5
th
 lowest population density, with a population of 227,816 (in 2008).  
6
 The list was provided by the District Department of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs. 
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The survey was designed to collect data on household and individual demographic-
economic variables, commune characteristics, household durable and fixed assets, child 
schooling and education expenditure, healthcare, food, non-food, housing expenditure, and 
borrowing activities. We also utilised GPS receivers to collect data on locations of households 
and facilities in order to measure distances from each household to facilities. The surveyed areas 
are located in the most dynamic region, HCMC in Vietnam. The city is the biggest economic-
financial centre in the country; it accounts for only 6.6% of the country‟s population in 2005 but 
one third of GDP. The city economy has recently been growing at above 10% per annum.
7
  
The surveyed district is the 5
th
 lowest population density district, and one of the peri-urban 
districts of HCMC. When it was established in 1997, the district relied heavily on agricultural 
production, but its economic structure has changed drastically due to current fast industrialisation 
and urbanisation. The average growth rate of industrial production and services has been very 
high for the period 1997-2008, namely 24.7% and 28.1% per year respectively. The total number 
of enterprises, approximately 400 in 1997, increased to 1,658 in 2006.
8
 In addition, the district 
population growth rate is very high; it increased 59% over the period 1997-2008. Population 
density within the surveyed district in 2008 is heterogeneous. Some wards are very highly 
populated (called more urban wards) e.g. Phuoc Binh (PB) (18,981 people/km
2
), Tang Nhon Phu 
A (TNPA) (6,546 people/km
2
), while others are relatively low (called more rural wards) e.g. 
Long Phuoc (LP) (300 people/km
2
), Long Truong (577 people/km
2
). The main economic 
activities of the district are non-farm economic activities such as industrial production, 
construction and services, accounting for more than 90%. For our sample, 72% of household 
heads are small traders, housewives, casual workers, factory workers and the jobless. 
3.2 Models for the probability of credit participation and credit constraints 
In this study, the aim is to determine possible factors affecting credit participation and credit 
constraints. Credit participation and credit constraints are binary variables where participating in 
credit (or being credit-constrained) takes a value of one, and zero otherwise. Thus, to estimate 
the probability of credit participation and credit constraints when dependent variable Y equals 
one given a set of explanatory variables xi, the Probit model is employed. The Probit model is 
written as follows. 
p(Y=1| x1, x2, …,,xk)= (z)= (+.x1  + .x2 + …+xk ) 
where pj is the outcome of the dummy (0-1) variable for the jth observation,  is the standard 
cumulative normal, xj is the vector of explanatory variables for observation j and  is the vector 
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 See at 
http://www.hochiminhcity.gov.vn/gioithieu/lists/posts/post.aspx?Source=/gioithieu/&Category=Gi%E1%BB%9Bi+
thi%E1%BB%87u+chung&ItemID=9&Mode=1  
8
 See at http://www.quan9.hochiminhcity.gov.vn/Office_Infor.asp?Cat=9&ID=192  
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of coefficients to be estimated. The Probit coefficients are not directly interpretable, but marginal 
effects for continuous variables could be calculated (at the mean) as: 
k
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
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
 
where xk is a vector of independent variable (k is the number of independent variables),  is the 
vector of estimated coefficients, and is the normal density function. For dummy variables, the 
discrete change in probability when the dummy variable switches from zero to one is calculated 
as )()( 01  xx   where xxx  01  except that the ith elements of 1x  and 0x  are set to one 
and zero respectively (StataCorp, 1997). 
The current literature suggests using physical and human capital endowment as 
explanatory variables to predict the probability of credit participation and credit constraints. 
Therefore, the Probit models include the household head‟s gender, age, education, marital status, 
household size,
9
 pre-survey income per capita,
10
 pre-survey assets (land/house/durable assets),
11
 
a dummy variable for phone ownership,
12
 location dummies, and distance to nearest bank.
13
 
Effects of other borrowing neighbours may affect the probability of credit participation and 
constraints because neighbouring households are likely to share information and borrowing 
experiences. So the proportion of borrowing neighbours within a radius of one kilometre of each 
respondent is used as a proxy for information flows.
14
 Accordingly, the model for credit 
participation is as follows: 
BORROWERij =  + X1ij 1 + X2ij  + X3j  + ij   (2) 
where BORROWERij is a binary variable representing whether household i in ward j borrowed 
(1) or not (0). X1ij is a vector of household characteristics and X2ij is the physical endowment of 
household i in ward j, while X3 is a vector of ward-level characteristics. These include the 
proportion of borrowing households within a radius of one kilometre and the distance to the 
nearest bank within a ward. 
                                                 
9
 The number of under-18-year old children and number of older-than-60-year old members are collinear with 
household size. However, the ratios of various age groups to total household size may not collinear with household 
size, thus we ran a regression with ratio of children to household size and ratio of the older-than 60 years old 
members to household size, but the estimates are statistically insignificant. As a result, we dropped the variables. 
10
 The income was collected by the District 9 Department of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs in collaboration 
with the Hunger Elimination and Poverty Reduction Unit of each ward in the district from December 2005 to 
January 2006 in order to classify poor households who are eligible for receiving assistance including preferred loans 
from the HEPRF. 
11
 We use only assets acquired over 24 months prior to oursurvey (rather than all assets) and pre-survey income 
(rather than current expenditure) to avoid possible endogeneity and reverse causality.  
12
 We use the dummy as a proxy for information access; we do not classify phones as durable assets because 
recently phones, especially landline phones, are given free by the service suppliers. Subscribers have to pay 
connection fees, monthly fixed charge and actual call charges. 
13
 To avoid the collinearity between ward dummy and the distance, the interactions between the distance and ward 
dummy are used instead of the distance itself. 
14
 Alternatively, borrowing neighbours may cause a crowding-out effect because they could be potential competitors 
when credit resources are limited. 
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In equation (2), all borrowers are treated the same in the sense that there is no difference 
between those who borrowed from formal credit sources and those who borrowed from informal 
credit suppliers. However, it is possible that segmented markets may exist causing the 
determinants of who can borrow from formal credit to be distinct from the determinants of who 
can access only informal credit. As a result, multinomial models may help to uncover the roles of 
each factor in segmented credit markets. Accordingly, the model can be as follows: 
SPECIFIED_BORROWERij =  + X1ij 1 + X2ij  + X3j + X4ij ij   (3) 
where SPECIFIED_BORROWERij is a multinomial variable representing whether a household i 
in ward j did not borrow (N), or borrowed from the informal credit only (I), or from both the 
informal and formal credit (B), or from the formal credit only (F). Xis are the same as previously 
defined.  
The results of equation (3) are reported as the Relative Risk Ratios (RRR). For example, 
for binary independent variables, suppose beta () is for the head‟s gender (1, 0 for male and 
female respectively), then to get the RRR 
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, and e
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 is RRR of household head‟s gender of corresponding outcome Y1, Y2, and 
Y3. 
For a continuous variable (e.g. head‟s age),15 the RRR (or eis obtainedas follows: 
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To examine the determinants of credit constraints, the following model is used: 
CONSTRAINTij = 0 + X1ij 1 + X2ij  + X3j  + X4ij + ij  (4) 
where CONSTRAINTij is a binary variable representing whether household i in ward j is credit-
constrained (1) or not (0). Credit-constrained households include rejected households, 
discouraged households, and partial borrowers; credit-unconstrained households consist of full 
borrowers and other households who do not want to borrow because they have sufficient 
                                                 
15
 If continuous variables in log form, we now are measuring the marginal increase in the RRR ratios for 100% 
increase in X at the mean. 
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resources to meet their demand for credit. Xis are the same as defined in credit participation 
modelling. 
3.3 Tobit Type 2 model for credit amount received 
Regarding credit amounts received, the dependent variable is continuous and can vary between 
zero (for non-borrowers) and a certain positive value. Therefore, in this case the Tobit model 
provides an appropriate estimator (Verbeek, 2004).  
Let Y* denote credit amount borrowed, and Zi is vector of explanatory variables, the estimation 
equation is postulated as follows: 
Yi* = Zi + ui  ui  ~ NID(0, σ
2
) 
However, for a large number of households the credit amount is zero; Tobin (1958) suggests the 
following model: 
Yi     =  .Zi + ui    if  Yi* > 0      for households with credit amount is positive, and 
0       if  Yi* ≤ 0     for households with credit amount is zero 
 A shortcoming of standard Tobit model regression is that the model may produce biased 
and inconsistent estimates if heteroscedasticity exists (Amemiya, 1984; Johnston & Dinardo, 
1997, p. 441). To overcome the problem, a Tobit Type 2 model, which can account for 
heteroscedasticity, is used. The model is implemented by using the interval regression estimator, 
which is a generalisation of the Tobit model, where responses can be point data, interval data, 
left-censored or right-censored. The error terms of the regression are presumed to be normally 
distributed, and the log likelihood function is as follows: 
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where ( ) is the standard cumulative normal and wj is the sampling weight for the jth 
observation. The vector of parameters of interest,   plus , are chosen to maximize the 
likelihood by a modified Newton-Raphson routine. For Lj  the data are left-censored, where 
the unobserved yj is only known to be less than or equal to the threshold yLj.  For Rj  the data 
are right-censored, with the unobserved yj only known to be greater than or equal to the threshold 
yRj. The other Ij  observations are intervals, where all that is known is that the unobserved yj 
is in the interval ].,[ 21 jj yy  in the current case, the data of credit amounts received are left-
censored, the unobserved yi is known to be equal to zero for non-borrowing. 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1 Main features of poor households’ credit 
As a preview to the econometric results, a general overview of poor households‟ credit in the 
peri-urban study areas of HCMC is provided. Formal credit provides 55% of credit (Table 1), 
which is mainly credit resources from government subsidised sources such as Vietnam Bank for 
Social Policy (VBSP), social political organisations, the Job Creation Support Fund (JCSF) and 
the Hunger Elimination and Poverty Reduction Fund (HEPRF). These lenders provide 
„preferred‟ or sometimes called „soft‟ or „subsidised‟ loans (low interest rate and easy lending 
conditions), and are the main sources of credit accounting for 51% of the total loans to the poor 
in the peri-urban areas (Table 2). 
However, the informal credit sector still plays a substantial role in providing credit to the 
poor; approximately 45% of loans, albeit of a smaller average value than formal loans. Amongst 
informal credit providers, mutual help amongst relatives, friends and neighbours provide more 
than one third of all loans. The Rotating Saving and Credit Associations (ROSCAs), private 
moneylenders and pawnbrokers only provide 8.4% of total loans to the poor (Table 2). This low 
share may be because interpersonal trust and social ties are weak in peri-urban and urban areas 
(Allcott et al, 2007; Debertin, n.d; Hofferth & Iceland, 1998). 
Interest rates for the poor‟s loans vary widely, from 0.78% per month on average for the 
formal credit to 2.14% (about 26% per year) for the informal sector with a large standard 
deviation of 5.9% (Table 2). The interest rate for informal credit is high compared to formal 
credit, but still lower than in many other developing countries. For example, a survey of 13 
developing countries by Banerjee and Duflo (2007, 2010) shows that informal credit lenders 
charged annual rates of 40% to 80% per annum. However, when loans from friends, relative and 
neighbours that are almost interest-free are excluded, the informal lenders charge very high 
interest rates at 11.3% per month or about 130% per year, higher than in many other developing 
countries. According to another survey by Conning and Udry (2005, p. 8), informal credit 
lenders charge interest at 40% to 120% annually in Pakistan, 20% to 120 % in India, 24% to 
84% in rural Thailand, and over 90% annually in Nigeria. 
Table 3 shows that the main purpose of the loans taken by the poor in the peri-urban areas 
is for non-production (73.4%). Consumption expenditure such as food, school fees and 
healthcare accounts for about 64% of total loans. On the other hand, only a quarter (in terms of 
both number of loans and loan value) is used for small production and businesses. This usage 
pattern is similar to the pattern found by Kedir et al (2007) in urban Ethiopia, but is much 
different from typical loan usage patterns in rural areas (Barslund & Tarp, 2007; Johnson & 
Morduch, 2007). 
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Table 4 shows the incidence of credit participation and credit constraints. Less than 10% of 
households had sufficient capital and did not want to borrow. Another 10% were discouraged 
from seeking capital. Amongst those households seeking credit in the 24 months prior to our 
survey, 43.8% of all households had borrowed sufficiently, 30% borrowed amounts less than the 
value they demanded, and 7.5% were denied by credit providers. Overall, three quarters of the 
surveyed households borrowed in the 24 months prior to the survey (304 households).
16
 Almost 
all households had loans in both periods; 0-12 months and 12-24 months prior to the survey.  
For credit participation, we simply treated households as borrowers if they had at least one 
loan during the 24 months prior to the survey, and otherwise they were classified as non-
borrowers. Meanwhile, potential borrowers are often excluded, discouraged, rejected, or rationed 
to smaller loans relative to what they might have optimally demanded; these potential borrowers 
are deemed credit-constrained. Accordingly, the number of credit-constrained households, 
unconstrained households, and credit participants were estimated and presented in Table 4. 
Although there are more than ten banks and credit institutions in the surveyed areas, the poor are 
highly credit-constrained (48% of the surveyed households). Since approximately 45% of the 
poor‟s loans were from the informal credit sector, and the poor might have been excluded from 
the formal credit, we could regard them as the formal credit-constrained. If that is true, the 
incidence of credit constraints would be higher than the current estimates suggest. 
Finally, Table 5 provides some preliminary information about differences between 
borrowers and non-borrowers. Overall, the borrowers and non-borrowers are no different in 
terms of occupations, gender, education, and marital status of the household head, access to 
internet/newspapers, TV/radio ownership, initial income, and assets acquired more than 24 
months prior to the survey. However, the borrowers are younger, have bigger households and 
more young household members, and own fewer assets acquired during the two years preceding 
the survey.  
In addition, borrowers tend to dwell in more rural wards and further away from markets 
and banks. We used GPS receivers to collect data on coordinates of each household and facility 
such as bank branch and market in order to estimate distance from each household to the nearest 
market and nearest bank. Figure 1 shows that there are many bank branches and credit 
institutions in the urban wards (or nearby) of Tang Nhon Phu A (TNPA) and Phuoc Binh (PB), 
while only one bank branch in the rural ward of Long Truong (LT) and no bank branch in (or 
nearby) the other surveyed rural ward of Long Phuoc (LP). Similarly for market presence, only 
one market in each rural ward, but many in urban wards or nearby. Clearly, the proximity to 
                                                 
16
 Households often borrowed more than one loan, some loans during the past 12 months, some loans somewhere 
between 12 and 24 months prior to the survey. 
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financial institutions does not help the poor to have access to credit. Other barriers rather than the 
proximity may play a role in obstructing the poor on the way to obtaining credit. 
Figure 1: Study household and financial facility locations in District 9 
 
Note: DongNai River is a large river and there is no bridge between District 9 and other side (DongNai 
province) of the river. All banks and credit institutions in the district appear in the blue pentagons. 
To city centre (16 km) 
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4.2 Determinants of credit participation by the poor: An econometric analysis 
4.2.1 The Probit estimates 
Estimates from probit models of the determinants of credit participation are presented in Table 6. 
Because of highly heterogeneous population density across the wards and possible 
multicollinearity between ward dummies and distance to the nearest banks (which vary mainly 
by ward), three separate estimation models are reported. 
The estimates reveal several determinants of credit participation by the poor in peri-urban 
areas. Households with older heads, and less significantly those currently married have a lower 
probability of borrowing. This may reflect the fact that households with unmarried-heads are 
smaller and have to borrow to smooth consumption when they have adverse shocks because they 
have lower ability to increase income from labour (Kochar, 1995, 1999). Indeed, the estimates 
show that larger households are more likely to be borrowers, perhaps because they are better 
credit risks because they have more relationships with community and more diversified sources 
of income (Schreiner & Nagarajan, 1998). It is also the case that initially richer households are 
more likely to be borrowers. The pre-survey income per capita, which is closely associated with 
labour income of the poor, has a significantly positive impact on credit participation. In addition, 
phone ownership that represents household wealth through the ability to afford phone bills and 
connection fees, and represents better conditions to communicate and maintain social networks, 
also positively influences credit participation (Table 6). In contrast, total values of fixed assets 
such as house, land,
17
 and other durable asset acquired over the 24 months prior to the survey 
have no impacts on borrowing (Table 6, columns 1, 2 and 3). The poor in peri-urban areas often 
lack or have incomplete legal documentation for the assets, e.g. land-use right certificates and 
house ownership certificates (Kim, 2004) because they do not have money to pay fees and do not 
know how and where to get the certificates done, hence the assets are unable to be lodged as 
collateral for their desired loans. 
There is no gender bias in microcredit participation in the peri-urban areas, contrast to 
what is in rural Vietnam found by Barslund and Tarp (2007) and Nguyen (2007). Our results also 
show that education of household heads does not significantly influence credit participation. The 
poor‟s household heads in our survey have low education, only 4.7 years of schooling compared 
to 8.4 years of schooling for general household heads in Vietnam surveyed in 2004 (VHLSS, 
2004). Moreover, these poor household heads usually work in unskilled sectors, such as small 
trade, factory workers, housewives and casual workers, where education is not rewarded well. 
Our finding is contrary to other studies from other developing countries where education has an 
important role in credit participation (Swain, 2007; Zeller, 1994). 
                                                 
17
 No single household acquired land and house within the last 24 months from the survey. 
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Households‟ dwelling location is an important determinant of credit market participation in 
the peri-urban areas. Almost all loans by the poor are small, collateral-free, and mainly based on 
social capital or interpersonal trust. Households in the more rural parts of the peri-urban area 
have better social capital than more urban households, thus they have higher likelihood of credit 
participation. This is shown by the significantly positive coefficients on the two rural wards, 
Long Truong (LT) and Long Phuoc (LP), in column 1 of Table 6.
18
 When exploring the role of 
distance within each ward, in the rural ward of Long Truong (LT), households that are far away 
from the nearest bank (also far away from the ward centre where households are more urban) are 
also found more likely to borrow (Figure 2).
19
 This re-confirms the role of social relationship and 
interpersonal trust in credit transactions in peri-urban areas. 
Figure 2: Predicted probabilities of credit participation by distance to the nearest bank 
 
The data exploration shows that most borrowing households (56%) in urban wards (TNPA 
and PB) borrowed from the formal (subsidised) credit channels, in contrast, most borrowing 
households in rural wards (LT and LP) borrowed from the informal credit sector. This means 
that the more rural poor households rely more on informal credit, whereas their more urban 
counterparts rely on government subsidised funds. 
The impact of distance to the nearest banks and main sources of the poor‟s credit in rural 
and urban areas could imply that households far away from ward centres (dwelling in rural 
countryside) could have better community relationships and interpersonal trust; better social 
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 Inclusion of distance to nearest market (interacted with ward dummies) in the models gives the similar result as 
distance to nearest bank, thus we do not report results of the regression with the distance to nearest market. 
19
 In LT ward, households living far away from the centre are rural household farmers or casual workers, while 
households near the ward centre are small traders, grocery shop keepers. In LP ward, all households are involved in 
rural economic activities. 
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capital help to ease access to informal credit sources, such as relatives, neighbours, friends, and 
other providers who mainly lend money on the basis of interpersonal trust rather than collateral. 
The proportion of borrowing neighbours influences negatively and significantly the 
likelihood of borrowing in urban wards (TNPA and PB), but not in rural wards (LT and LP) 
(Table 6, column 2). This implies that households in urban areas compete against their 
neighbours in accessing limited credit resources from subsidised funds, but this is not the case in 
the rural wards because the poor there rely more on informal credit. 
In summary, household size, younger households, initial income, phone ownership, and 
living in more rural countryside areas are important determinants of credit participation by the 
peri-urban poor. On the other hand, gender, education and assets do not matter in credit 
participation of poor households. Further, households in rural wards with presumably better 
relationships and interpersonal trust have advantages in accessing credit, especially informal 
credit. Competition by other borrowing neighbours in accessing credit resources, especially 
subsidised funds, is also an influential factor for credit participation by the poor in urban areas. 
4.2.2 Tobit Type 2 for loan amounts received by the poor 
The Tobit model estimates in Table 7 reveal some key findings: First, gender does not really 
matter in credit participation as found and discussed in the preceding section, but it plays a role 
in explaining loan size. Male-headed households received lower amounts of loans than female-
headed households. The finding is contrary to the common trend in developing countries because 
females are often involved in small businesses which need smaller loans (Armendariz & 
Morduch, 2005, p. 181); however, in peri-urban areas loans are mainly used for non-production 
so the type of business activity of females may matter less for loan size. 
Second, the age of household heads has a slightly positive effect on loan size. The older 
households tend to receive greater loans, with a maximum at about 46 years old. Very young or 
very old headed-households have a smaller labour force, and hence have lower ability to earn 
and repay.
20
 Therefore, they may be lent smaller amounts, or they themselves favour smaller 
loans to fit with their demand and ability to repay.  
Third, the initial income per capita and household sizes are important determinants of loan 
size because an increase in household size would help to increase labour income and diversify 
income sources (Schreiner & Nagarajan, 1998), and also increase demand for consumption. 
Finally, education level of household heads, head‟s marital status, assets acquired prior to 
borrowing, location dummies, distance to the nearest banks and the proportion of borrowing 
neighbours make no significant difference to loan sizes. 
                                                 
20
 Scatter plot of household size against head‟s age or regression household size on head‟s age and head‟s age 
squared give a clear inverse U-shaped relationship between household size and head‟s age.  
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4.2.3 The Multinomial Logit estimates for credit participation  
The binary Probit models help examine the roles of household characteristics and endowments in 
credit participation regardless of credit sources and of possibly different roles of each factor in 
specified credit market segments. Pooling credit market segments would conceal the roles of 
each factor. Therefore, to provide more nuanced insights, the surveyed households are classified 
into four groups: Non-borrowing, borrowing from informal credit, borrowing from formal credit, 
and borrowing from both informal and formal credit. The Multinomial Logit model (MNL) is 
then employed to examine factors influencing the probability of specified credit participation.  
Amongst 411 households, 26.0% of the surveyed households did not borrow, 23.6% 
borrowed from only informal sources, 25.3% borrowed from only formal sources, and 26.0% 
borrowed from both formal and informal credit. The purpose of the MNL model is to compare 
each outcome probability with the base outcome of the non-borrower group. The estimates are 
presented in Table 8, in the form of the relative risk ratios (RRR).  
Household heads’ gender and age 
To interpret the estimated coefficients, we provide two illustrations by using a dummy (e.g. 
gender) and a continuous variable coefficient (e.g. age). The head‟s gender coefficient e 
=1.3865 (Table 8, Model 1, column 1) means that the probability of borrowing from informal 
credit by males is 38.65% (i.e. 1.3865-1.00) higher than for females. Similarly, e

 = 0.8756 
means that the probability of borrowing from formal credit by males is 12.44% (i.e. 0.8756-1.00) 
lower than for females. Nevertheless, the effect of head‟s gender is not statistically significant 
across models and credit market segments.  For a continuous variable of head‟s age, the RRR is 
about 0.96 across models and sources of credit, smaller than one, meaning that when a household 
head gets an additional year older the ratio of credit participation probability will decline by 
about 4%, keeping other things constant.  
Household size, phone ownership, and pre-survey income  
The estimates show that the ratios of borrowing probability increase with household size in 
all credit market segments. Greater household size represents a bigger demand for consumption 
and a better ability for income generation and debt repayment. Similarly, having a phone has a 
positive influence on the likelihood of participation in all credit markets, but the effect is highly 
significant only in the formal credit market. Owning a phone has advantages to communicate and 
obtain information about formal credit sources, and also proxies for household wealth through 
affordability of connection charges and phone bills. Similar to phone ownership, the pre-survey 
income per capita positively affects credit participation in all credit market segments (Table 8 
and Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Predicted probabilities of participation in specified credit sources by pre-survey 
income (in logarithm) 
 
Note: The slope-downward line depicts the declining probability of being non-borrowers as the income 
increases. 
Marital status of household heads 
Single-head households such as the divorced, separated, widowed and unmarried tend to 
borrow more from informal credit than the current married-head households. In Vietnam, the 
single-head households are often considered „less lucky‟ or „disadvantaged‟, and thus have 
difficulties in social networks. These single-head households are often older-headed households 
who have less ability to smooth consumption by themselves if they face adverse shocks, 
especially demographic shocks, because they do not have enough working household members 
to increase income by increasing labour working hours. Therefore they are forced to borrow 
especially from informal credit as discussed in Kochar (1995).  
Household dwelling locations and distance to the nearest banks 
In addition, loans to the poor are small, collateral-free, and based mainly on social capital 
or interpersonal trust. As discussed earlier, households in the rural wards have more advantages 
compared to urban households when accessing informal and both-credit sources, hence the ratio 
of credit participation probability in informal and both-credit-sources by households in rural 
wards (LT and LP) is higher (Table 8, Model 1). In contrast, household dwelling locations and 
distance to the nearest bank do not affect the ratios of probability of formal credit participation. 
In other words, formal credit is evenly distributed across wards (Table 8, Model 1, column 3) 
and within each ward (Table 8, Model 3, column 3).  
On the other hand, when considering distance to the nearest banks within each ward, the 
distance does not significantly affect the ratio of probability of informal credit participation in 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
P
re
d
ic
te
d
 p
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
5 6 7 8 9
Pre-survey income in log
non-borrow informal credit
both-source-credit formal credit
 21  
the urban wards, but it positively affects the ratio of probability of informal credit participation 
in rural wards. In other words, the ratios of probability of informal credit participation increase 
significantly with distance to the nearest banks only in rural wards (Figure 1 and Figure 4).  
Figure 4: Predicted probabilities of participation in specified credit sources by distance to 
the nearest bank 
 
The upward-slope of the curves indicates that the probability of participation in a specified 
credit markets will increase with the distance from each household to the nearest bank. However, 
the multinomial Logit models report the ratio of probability of a specified credit participation 
and probability of being in the base (non-borrowing) group. Therefore, the gap between each 
curve for a particular borrower group and the base curve becomes the issue of interest, for 
example the gap between informal credit borrowing (the red dashes) and the base curve of non-
borrowing (solid-curve) represents the ratio of the probability of informal credit participation and 
the probability of being in non-borrowing group. In rural wards (two top panels of Figure 4), the 
gaps become larger when households dwell far away from banks which are often located at ward 
centres. These households have easier access to informal credit thanks to possibly better 
community relationships and higher interpersonal trust.  
In short, households in rural wards have greater propensity to borrow from informal credit 
compared to urban households; and within a rural ward, households far away from ward centres 
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rely more on informal credit because of either better social capital or further distance to the 
banks. 
Proportion of borrowing neighbours: Competition or crowding-out effects 
The estimates of the interactions between the proportion of borrowing neighbours and 
ward dummies reveals that there is a crowding-out effect from the neighbours in accessing only 
formal (subsidised) credit in all the wards.  For example, the RRR is 0.0159 (Table 8, Model 2, 
column 3), meaning that when the rate of borrowing neighbours in LP ward increases by 10 
percentage points the ratio of formal credit participation probability will decline by about 9.8% 
[i.e. (1.00-0.0159)x10%], keeping other things constant. 
Other insignificant factors 
Controlling for other variables, education and the initial assets play no significant roles in 
credit participation even in the formal credit sector. However, as previously discussed, most 
formal credit to poor households in the studied areas are from the government subsidised funds, 
such as the HEPRF, VBSP, and other supporting funds, but very few of the loans are from 
commercial banks. Consequently, the key lenders require neither collateral nor specific 
education when making lending decisions.  
In summary, age, household size, and pre-treatment income have important roles in all 
credit market segments. In contrast, gender, education, and pre-survey assets are found to have 
no role in explaining credit participation in any specified credit market segments. The household 
location, phone ownership, and marital status of household heads have different roles in different 
credit segments for the poor in the peri-urban areas. Finally, credit subsidies may lead to credit 
demand excess and crowding-out effect amongst the borrowers. 
4.3 Determinants of credit constraints of poor households 
Though 74% of surveyed households borrowed, the predicted probability of credit constraints is 
high, at 48% (Table 9). If credit constraints are more related to the credit supply side, then the 
determinants of credit constraints could be more related to obstacles in the credit markets of 
developing countries. Similar to Crook and Hochguertel (2005), Jappelli (1990), Magri (2002), 
and Thaicharoen et al (2004), we find that higher income reduces the likelihood of being credit-
constrained, even though all studied households were poor.  
Surprisingly, the income also has a U-shaped effect on the probability of credit constraints 
(Figure 5) with the minimum probability at the income level of about VND 3.5 million (about 
US$210). This U-shape effect of income on credit constraints is contrary to Chen and Chivakul 
(2008) who found the inverted-U shape effect for general households rather than the poor in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. All households in our sample were poor and most of them borrowed 
 23  
from informal and preferred formal credit; extremely poor households, however, were excluded 
by both informal lenders and government subsidised funds.
21
 Therefore, the higher is income per 
capita the lower the credit constraints. On the other hand, households whose income per capita is 
higher than VND 3.5 million were more credit-constrained as income increased. The credit 
constraints from the income level of VND 3.5 million onward could not be due to the exclusion 
by the microcredit lenders but due to higher demand for credit to finance bigger projects, 
businesses or spending. This demand for credit should be financed by formal credit, especially 
commercial banks, but the demand for credit was not yet met, and hence the households were 
still credit-constrained. 
Figure 5: Predicted probabilities of credit constraints by pre-survey income per capita 
 
In addition to income, in the Vietnamese context, assets such as land, house and durable 
fixed assets mainly represent household wealth because households usually lack investment 
choices for their savings due to unstable capital markets and high inflation (Barslund & Tarp, 
2007). In oursurveyed areas, fast industrialisation and urbanisation have caused real estate to be 
more marketable and increase property values. This enabled the poor to access credit because 
lenders may consider the property or fixed assets as collateral, if asset owners have legal 
documentation, when they sort out their clients (Crook & Hochguertel, 2005; Kedir et al, 2007; 
Jappelli, 1990; and Zeller, 1994). Without documentation the assets are not used as collateral, 
but the assets may indicate potential repayment ability because the peri-urban and urban poor 
also have informal property transactions without legal documents since informal property 
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markets function well in developing countries, including Vietnam (Kim, 2004; Mooya & Cloete, 
2007). As a result, the households owning higher asset values are less likely to be credit-
constrained since the assets can be informally sold to repay debts even though they are not able 
to be lodged as collateral when borrowing. 
Contrary to Barslund and Tarp (2007), Izumida and Pham (2002), Kedir et al, (2007), 
Jappelli (1990), and Zeller (1994), the credit-constrained and unconstrained households are 
homogenous in terms of household heads‟ gender, age, education, marital status, and household 
size,
22
 perhaps because the current study focuses on the poor rather than general population. In 
addition, the probability of the constraints is not different across wards, and not affected by the 
proportion of borrowing neighbours (Table 9, Model 2). 
Finally, households dwelling far away from banks within each ward had a higher 
probability of being credit-constrained. The effect of the distance to the nearest bank is 
significant for TNPA, PB, and LT wards, but is not for LP ward (Table 9, Model 3). LP ward is a 
purely rural area where the distance does not obstruct the poor households from credit resources, 
and the likelihood of credit participation and credit constraints are not determined by where the 
households are situated. Better community, relatives, neighbouring relationships and 
interpersonal trust may help households in pure rural areas like LP ward to have not only a 
higher probability of credit participation (Table 6), especially credit from informal sector, but 
also lower the likelihood of being credit-constrained (Table 9) compared to the other wards in 
the areas. This suggests that community mutual help systems through credit could do a good job 
in smoothing consumption and investing in healthcare and children‟s schooling. On the other 
hand, given the condition of weak community relationships in more urban wards, poor 
households find it hard to borrow and are highly credit-constrained. Subsidised funds are usually 
the last resort for lenders to help the poor in the urban areas. 
For the purely rural ward of LP, the distance to the nearest bank does not affect the 
probability of credit participation and credit constraints. This finding is consistent with Barslund 
and Tarp (2007, p. 499) who find that distance to district centres where there are bank offices 
does not affect the likelihood of credit rationing in rural Vietnam. On the contrary, in our case, 
all poor households sited near banks in the urban wards have lower probability of being credit-
constrained. Thus, it suggests that one would better consider the effect of distance within each 
region or area (i.e. using interaction terms between the distance and dummy of areas) rather than 
compare across various areas because each area has its own socio-economic conditions, and thus 
distance matters in credit constraints in some certain areas. 
                                                 
22
 We also checked with household labour force (persons aged 18-60 years old), the estimation result is similar to 
the case of household size. 
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5. Summary of findings 
Examining factors affecting credit participation and credit constraints in peri-urban areas in 
Vietnam reveals:  First, the presence of many commercial banks does not help the poor to access 
to formal credit, and hence the poor in the peri-urban areas rely heavily on informal credit. 
Furthermore, unlike the usage pattern of loans in rural Vietnam, loans in the peri-urban areas are 
mainly used for consumption. Second, households in rural wards have a higher probability of 
borrowing than their counterparts in the urban wards because of better social relationships in 
rural areas. Moreover, competition from borrowing neighbours adversely affect the propensity of 
borrowing only in urban wards where the poor depend more on government subsidised credit 
funds, which are limited.  
Third, a closer look at specified microcredit sources reveals that the roles of marital status, 
communication facilities, dwelling places, and competition from neighbours vary across 
different credit market segments. Accordingly, married-head households tend to avoid informal 
credit, whereas the better-communicating households borrow more from formal credit lenders. 
Households far away from banks were unable to borrow from the formal credit resources; 
however, these households in rural areas were more likely to borrow from informal credit 
lenders. Moreover, the competition among households exists only in formal credit markets which 
provide mostly subsidised credit loans. Overall, pooling formal and informal credit market 
segments would blur the picture of determining factors of credit participation. 
Finally, wealthier households in terms of asset holdings and phone ownership amongst the 
poor group appear less credit-constrained. Only in a purely rural ward (LP) does the likelihood of 
credit constraints not increase with distance to the nearest banks. Further, the poor in urban 
wards are slightly more credit-constrained in formal commercial credit due to exclusion by 
commercial banks, and by informal credit presumably due to weak community relationships and 
interpersonal trust. 
There remain some caveats in this study; the determinants of credit participation and 
constraints would come from the unobservable attributes such as households‟ entrepreneurial 
ability, attitude to risks, and access to social networks, which are assumed to be associated with 
pre-survey incomes and assets in this study. Further advances on the current research should 
control for these attributes by employing fixed effects methods to panel data on confirm the 
finding in this paper. 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Sources and sizes of loans by credit provider 
Sources of loans Frequency 
(no of loans) 
Percent in  
total (%) 
Mean 
(VND 
1,000)  
Standard  
Deviation 
Formal credit  336 55.26 9,327 33,421 
VBSP (1) 37 6.06 9,622 15,764 
Agribank (2) 18 2.96 26,444 46,482 
Other commercial banks (3) 8 1.32 119,000 176,254 
JCSF (4) 29 4.77 4,564 3,655 
Social political organisations (5) 62 10.20 4,564 3,472 
HEPRF (6) 182 29.93 5,176 4,189 
Informal credit  272 44.74 5,229 12,760 
Moneylenders, ROSCAs, 
pawnbrokers, others (7) 
51 8.39 9,218 15,870 
Friends, relatives, neighbours (8) 221 36.35 4,308 11,780 
Overall  608 100 7,494 26,330 
Source: own calculation from author’s survey;  
VBSP: Vietnam Bank for Social Policies; JCSP: Job Creation Support Fund; HEPRF: The Hunger 
Elimination and Poverty Reduction Funds; ROSCAs: Rotating savings and credit associations  
 
Table 2: Sources, sizes and interest rates of loans 
Credit sector Percent in  
total  
Loan sizes  
(VND 1,000) 
Monthly interest  
rates (%) 
 (%) Mean  Std.Dev Mean  Std.Dev 
By formal/informal sector      
Formal 55.26 9,327 33,421 0.78 0.70 
Informal  44.74 5,229 12,760 2.14 5.93 
    Friends, relatives & neighbours 36.35 4,308 11,780 0.033 0.27 
    Other informal sources 8.39 9,218 15,870 11.29 9.22 
By preferred sources      
Preferred loans  51.00 5,503 6,725 0.76 0.72 
Non-preferred loans 49.00 9,564 36,897 2.05 5.67 
Overall  100 7,494 26,330 1.40 4.05 
Source: own calculation from author’s survey 
Notes: Preferred loans include items 1, 4, 5, and 6; Non-preferred loans are of 2, 3, 7, and 8 in Table 1. 
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Table 3: Shares and sizes of loans by purposes 
Purpose of loans Percent in 
total (%) 
Mean 
(VND 1,000) 
Standard 
deviation 
Production/business 26.64 6,512 5,729 
Non-production 73.36 7,850 30,550 
    Consumption  30.92 3,163 4,846 
    Debt payment 4.61 14,661 37,752 
    House acquisition/repairs 3.62 40,977 63,517 
    Schooling fees 16.94 3,665 2,239 
    Health care  16.12 11,346 51,013 
    Others  1.15 15,143 17,478 
Overall  100 7,494 26,330 
Source: own calculation from author’s survey 
Note: Exchange rate in USD/VND = 16,481 
 
Table 4: Demand for credit, credit participation and credit constraints 
Specified categories Number of 
households 
Percent in  
total (%) 
Household has demand for credit in the past 24 months 
prior to the survey? 
411 100 
No, do not want to borrow 76 18.49 
Sufficient capital, no need credit (a) 35 8.52 
Discouraged households (b) 41 9.97 
Yes, households need capital 335 81.51 
Was not lent any money (denied) (c) 31 7.54 
Was lent amounts less than what households 
wanted (d) 
124 30.17 
Was lent fully (e) 180 43.80 
Credit participation in the past 24 months 411 100 
Borrowers (d & e) 304 73.97 
Non-borrowers  (a, b & c) 107 26.03 
Credit constraints  411 100 
Credit-constrained (b, c & d) 196 47.69 
Credit-unconstrained  (a & e) 215 52.31 
Source: own calculation from author’s survey 
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Table 5: Means of some main variables and t-values for equal means by borrowing status 
Variable Borrowers Non-borrowers t-value  
Mean  Std. Dev Mean  Std. Dev 
Job (favourable jobs=1) 0.122 0.327 0.140 0.349 0.48 
Head‟s sex (male=1)  0.507 0.501 0.505 0.502 0.03 
Head education (year) 4.911 3.35 4.664 3.76 0.60 
Head‟s married (yes=1) 0.648 0.478 0.607 0.491 0.74 
Head‟s age 52.901 13.97 59.467 15.46 3.87** 
Household size 5.191 2.343 4.523 2.597 2.34* 
Child under 6 years old (yes=1) 0.309 0.463 0.178 0.384 2.89** 
Children aged 6-18 1.118 1.024 0.869 1.100 2.05* 
Persons aged 18-60 3.230 1.694 2.692 1.793 2.71** 
Older-than-60 person (yes=1) 0.352 0.478 0.533 0.352 3.25** 
Rural area (LT & LP =1) 0.635 0.482 0.477 0.502 2.83** 
Distance to nearest bank (Km) 2.226 2.098 1.804 1.900 1.92+ 
Distance to nearest market (Km) 1.409 1.032 1.085 0.872 3.10** 
Have a phone (yes=1) 0.809 0.394 0.644 0.481 3.18** 
Internet/newspapers (yes=1) 0.053 0.224 0.037 0.191 0.68 
Have a TV and radio (yes=1) 0.944 0.230 0.925 0.264 0.66 
Durable & fixed assets acquired within 
24 months prior to survey 
4,372 6,264 9,057 11,693 2.78** 
Durable & fixed assets acquired over 
24 months prior to survey 
849,924 821,335 786,097 795,593 0.71 
Pre-survey income per capita 3,592 814 3,505 925 0.86 
Notes: t statistics significant at 10% (+), 5% (*), and 1% (**); assets, income, and expenditure are in 
VND 1,000. 
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Table 6: Marginal effects on the probability of credit participation (Probit estimation) 
Explanatory Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Head‟s sex (male=1) -0.0285 -0.0302 -0.0211 
 (0.55) (0.59) (0.41) 
Head‟s age (years) -0.0073 -0.0072 -0.0073 
 (4.29)** (4.28)** (4.32)** 
Head‟s education (years of schooling) 0.0017 0.0019 0.0027 
 (0.22) (0.27) (0.37) 
Marital status (yes=1) -0.1033 -0.0974 -0.1094 
 (1.86)+ (1.75)+ (1.95)+ 
Household size in log
(a)
 0.1932 0.1951 0.1932 
 (3.56)** (3.63)** (3.59)** 
Pre-survey income per capita in log 0.1781 0.1730 0.1884 
 (2.15)* (2.13)* (2.28)* 
Pre-survey assets in log (assets acquired -0.0010 0.0018 -0.0014 
over 24 months prior to survey) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) 
Phone ownership (yes=1) 0.1309 0.1232 0.1389 
 (2.26)* (2.14)* (2.34)* 
Phuoc Binh – PB (urban) 0.0185   
 (0.27)   
Long Truong – LT (rural) 0.1570   
 (2.58)**   
Long Phuoc – LP (rural) 0.1146   
 (1.95)+   
Interaction terms    
Borrowing neighbour proportion x TNPA  -0.6642  
  (1.95)+  
Borrowing neighbour proportion x PB  -0.5928  
  (1.81)+  
Borrowing neighbour proportion x LT  -0.3297  
  (1.14)  
Borrowing neighbour proportion x LP  -0.3921  
  (1.35)  
Distance to nearest bank (Km) x TNPA    -0.0968 
   (1.20) 
Distance to nearest bank (Km) x PB    -0.1534 
   (1.06) 
Distance to nearest bank (Km) x LT    0.1277 
   (2.09)* 
Distance to nearest bank (Km) x LP    0.0113 
   (0.70) 
Wald 2 test 44.56** 46.80** 53.35** 
Prob> 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Predicted probability at x bar 0.760 0.761 0.763 
Pseudo R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.13 
Observations 411 411 411 
Notes: Robust z statistics in parentheses; statistically significant at 10% (+), at 5% (*), and at 1% (**). 
Tang Nhon Phu A (TNPA) ward is set as a base for ward dummies. 
(a
 
)
The marginal effect of household 
size (hhsize) on the predicted probability is calculated as, suppose Y= + .ln(hhsize), so that dY/dU = 
dY/d(hhsize)= .(1/hhsize), keep other things equal. 
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Table 7: Interval regression (Tobit Type 2) for loan amounts received 
Explanatory Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Head‟s sex (male=1) -3,962.37 -3,977.1 -3,762.87 
 (2.01)* (2.02)* (1.92)+ 
Head‟s age (years) 528.75 525.4 500.85 
 (1.45) (1.43) (1.37) 
Head‟s age squared -5.57 -5.50 -5.38 
 (1.78)+ (1.75)+ (1.72)+ 
Head‟s education (years) 147.38 153.9 142.50 
 (0.51) (0.53) (0.47) 
Marital status (yes=1) 1,972.25 2,041.4 1,762.18 
 (0.90) (0.94) (0.81) 
Household size in log 4,621.38 4,631.5 4,636.29 
 (2.48)* (2.48)* (2.43)* 
Pre-survey income per capita in log 7,322.34 7,252.5 7,272.70 
(2.01)* (2.02)* (1.98)* 
Pre-survey assets in log (assets acquired 624.64 653.2 572.99 
over 24 months prior to survey) (1.14) (1.19) (1.04) 
Phone ownership (yes=1) 5,024.36 4,963.4 4,965.04 
 (2.89)** (2.85)** (2.81)** 
Phuoc Binh – PB (urban) -1,606.15   
 (0.61)   
Long Truong – LT (rural) 2,389.45   
 (1.09)   
Long Phuoc – LP (rural) 874.92   
 (0.41)   
Interaction terms    
Borrowing neighbour proportion x TNPA  -6,635.6  
 (0.82)  
Borrowing neighbour proportion x PB  -8,489.4  
  (1.15)  
Borrowing neighbour proportion x LT  -2,397.1  
  (0.38)  
Borrowing neighbour proportion x LP  -4,124.7  
  (0.60)  
Distance to nearest bank (Km) x TNPA    -2,526.62 
  (0.87) 
Distance to nearest bank (Km) x PB   -7,899.71 
   (1.53) 
Distance to nearest bank (Km) x LT   304.95 
   (0.18) 
Distance to nearest bank (Km) x LP   -280.37 
   (0.54) 
Constant -85,633 -81,289 -81,505 
 (2.40)* (2.25)* (2.28)* 
Wald 2 test 28.32** 29.42** 27.22* 
Prob>2 0.0050 0.0057 0.0116 
Sigma (test for Tobit model) 13720.32 13722.66 13715.53 
 (8.90)** (8.89)** (8.94)** 
Observations 405 405 405 
Notes: Robust z statistics in parentheses; statistically significant at 10% (+), at 5% (*), and at 1% (**). Five 
extreme outliers (of loan amounts) are dropped. 
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Table 8: The multinomial Logit estimation with Relative Risk Ratios for credit participation in specified credit sources  
 
Explanatory  
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
RRR(b) Outcome for RRR Outcome for RRR Outcome for 
Informal 
Credit  
Both-source 
Credit  
Formal 
Credit  
Informal 
Credit  
Both-source 
Credit  
Formal 
Credit  
Informal 
Credit  
Both-source 
Credit  
Formal 
Credit  
22.63% 26.03% 25.30% 22.63% 26.03% 25.30% 22.63% 26.03% 25.30% 
Head‟s gender  1.3865 0.5995 0.8756 1.3846 0.6006 0.8604 1.6307 0.6397 0.8694 
(male=1) (0.87) (1.43) (0.36) (0.87) (1.43) (0.41) (1.23) (1.25) (0.38) 
Head‟s age 0.9534 0.9628 0.9641 0.9539 0.9633 0.9644 0.9524 0.9614 0.9645 
 (3.81)** (3.38)** (3.07)** (3.79)** (3.35)** (3.03)** (3.79)** (3.48)** (3.05)** 
Head‟s education 0.9523 1.0346 1.0179 0.9555 1.0381 1.0165 0.9598 1.0311 1.0264 
(years) (0.91) (0.67) (0.35) (0.85) (0.74) (0.32) (0.76) (0.60) (0.52) 
Marital status  0.3492 0.7396 0.6627 0.3616 0.7390 0.7269 0.3084 0.6911 0.6253 
(yes=1) (2.55)* (0.76) (1.01) (2.47)* (0.77) (0.79) (2.66)** (0.92) (1.14) 
Household size   2.2269 3.2430 3.3899 2.2499 3.2414 3.4761 2.0855 3.5470 3.3700 
in logarithm (2.17)* (3.15)** (3.23)** (2.20)* (3.12)** (3.31)** (1.96)* (3.37)** (3.22)** 
Pre-survey income 2.6851 3.7543 2.4145 2.5350 3.4970 2.3867 2.9895 3.2606 2.8708 
in logarithm (1.66)+ (2.11)* (1.70)+ (1.58) (2.01)* (1.65)+ (1.71)+ (2.07)* (1.99)* 
Pre-survey  1.0871 0.9553 0.9591 1.1010 0.9578 0.9756 1.1197 0.9367 0.9351 
assets in logarithm (0.69) (0.38) (0.35) (0.80) (0.36) (0.21) (0.91) (0.54) (0.57) 
Phone ownership 1.4456 1.7160 3.4660 1.3881 1.6439 3.4750 1.5408 1.7119 3.4014 
(yes=1) (1.00) (1.45) (2.98)** (0.89) (1.35) (2.95)** (1.11) (1.42) (2.89)** 
PB ward (urban) 0.3026 1.5091 1.3147       
 (1.83)+ (0.80) (0.63)       
LT ward (rural) 3.3774 6.0195 0.6904       
 (2.68)** (3.78)** (0.76)       
LP ward (rural) 1.7661 4.0763 1.2173       
 (1.31) (3.15)** (0.46)       
 
(Continued next page)
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Table 8: The multinomial Logit estimation with Relative Risk Ratios for credit participation in specified credit sources (continued) 
 
Explanatory  
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
RRR Outcome for RRR Outcome for RRR Outcome for 
Informal 
Only 
Both 
sources 
Formal 
only 
Informal 
Only 
Both 
sources 
Formal only Informal 
 only 
Both 
 sources 
Formal 
only 
22.63% 26.03% 25.30% 22.63% 26.03% 25.30% 22.63% 26.03% 25.30% 
Effects of  the proportion of borrowing neighbours within each ward  
Borrowing neighbour proportion x 
TNPA  
  0.0258 0.2249 0.0061    
  (1.43) (0.57) (2.31)*    
Borrowing neighbour proportion x 
PB 
  0.0058 0.4571 0.0122    
  (2.03)* (0.31) (2.09)*    
Borrowing neighbour proportion x 
LT 
  0.2312 2.8864 0.0084    
  (0.67) (0.48) (2.54)*    
Borrowing neighbour proportion x 
LP 
  0.1050 1.8797 0.0159    
  (1.02) (0.28) (2.23)*    
Effects of  the distance to the nearest bank from households within each ward  
Distance to nearest       1.4795 0.1511 0.5846 
bank x TNPA       (0.68) (2.84)** (1.00) 
Distance to nearest       0.2846 0.0419 0.9219 
bank x PB        (0.85) (2.93)** (0.09) 
Distance to nearest       5.2577 1.2746 0.5532 
bank x LT        (3.63)** (0.57) (1.09) 
Distance to nearest       1.2595 0.9533 0.9895 
bank x LP        (1.85)+ (0.45) (0.10) 
Wald 2 test 106.20 116.97 114.35 
Prob>2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1144 0.1215 0.1288 
Observations 411 411 411 
Notes: Robust z statistics in parentheses; statistically significant at 10% (+), at 5% (*), and at 1% (**); the base outcome (0) is non-borrowing 
households (non-borrowers which accounts for 26.03% observations). 
 
(b)
RRR coefficient is exponentiated coefficient = e

 = exp(, e.g. exp(0.3268)=1.3865 where =0.3268 is the estimated outcome of the standard 
multinomial Logit model.       
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Table 9: Marginal effects on the probability of credit constraints (probit model) 
Explanatory Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Head‟s sex (male=1) 0.0669 0.0676 0.0652 
 (1.07) (1.08) (1.04) 
Head‟s age (years) 0.0016 0.0016 0.0021 
 (0.82) (0.83) (1.04) 
Head‟s education (years) 0.0002 0.0006 0.0016 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.18) 
Marital status (yes=1) -0.0218 -0.0257 -0.0177 
 (0.31) (0.37) (0.25) 
Household size in log -0.0255 -0.0264 -0.0287 
 (0.41) (0.42) (0.46) 
Pre-survey income per capita  -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 
 (3.22)** (3.20)** (3.40)** 
Pre-survey income per capita squared 1.01e-07 1.01e-07 1.03e-07 
 (3.27)** (3.25)** (3.47)** 
Pre-survey assets in log (acquired over -0.0399 -0.0407 -0.0344 
24 months prior to survey) (1.96)+ (2.00)* (1.67)+ 
Phone ownership (yes=1) -0.2171 -0.2158 -0.2070 
 (3.33)** (3.30)** (3.12)** 
Phuoc Binh – PB (urban) 0.0347   
 (0.37)   
Long Truong – LT (rural) -0.0012   
 (0.01)   
Long Phuoc – LP (rural) -0.0978   
 (1.28)   
Interaction terms    
Borrowing neighbour proportion x TNPA  0.2815  
  (0.73)  
Borrowing neighbour proportion x PB  0.3216  
  (0.89)  
Borrowing neighbour proportion x LT  0.2406  
  (0.76)  
Borrowing neighbour proportion x LP  0.1234  
  (0.39)  
Distance to nearest bank (km) x TNPA    0.1813 
   (1.78)+ 
Distance to nearest bank (km) x PB    0.3732 
   (2.09)* 
Distance to nearest bank (km) x LT    0.1685 
   (2.30)* 
Distance to nearest bank (km) x LP    0.0115 
   (0.61) 
Wald 2 test 34.99** 34.33** 40.40** 
Prob>2 0.0005 0.0011 0.0001 
Predicted probability 0.4790 0.4790 0.4790 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0700 0.0700 0.0800 
Observations 411 411 411 
Notes: Robust z statistics in parentheses; statistically significant at 10% (+), at 5% (*), and at 1% (**). 
Tang Nhon Phu A (TNPA)  
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